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European Parliament elections were held from 22 – 25 May. We asked a number of experts to comment
on the results and what the elections mean for individual countries across Europe.
The Front National is now an equal player across the whole of France, and no longer merely a
‘nuisance’ to the mainstream – Jocelyn Evans – University of Leeds
Farage’s world is an authoritarian fantasy – Mary Evans – LSE Gender Institute
The most interesting development in Germany is the ascendancy of the Eurosceptic Alternative für
Deutschland– Kai Arzheimer – University of Mainz
Despite the headlines about Euroscepticism, the voice of those worst affected by the crisis is now
louder. Could it be that a more sanguine reading of these electoral results is warranted? – Iain Begg –
LSE European Institute
Unlike the other radical right-wing parties is Europe, the Golden Dawn has managed to attract voters
from across the party system in Greece – Sofia Vasilopoulou, University of York, and Daphne
Halikiopoulo, University of Reading
The EP election results will clearly have great implications for the political landscape in Europe  –
Sara Hagemann – LSE European Institute
What we are witnessing is, in a sense, a reconstitution of a form of class politics  – Eric Shaw –
University of Stirling
The reverberations of the Ukraine crisis in the Latvian domestic political debate certainly did not help
Harmony in its bid to attract the Latvian leftist vote – Licia Cianetti – University College London
The European election in Spain confirms the recession of two-party politics and the advancement of
left Eurocriticism – Juan Rodríguez-Teruel – University of Valencia
The elections in Hungary were a symbol of the population’s continued disappointment with the
inability of the liberal-left opposition forces to unite – Erin Marie Saltman
The Front National is now an equal player across the whole of France, and no longer merely a ‘nuisance’ to
the mainstream
Jocelyn Evans is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds
The Front National’s victory in last night’s election had been forewarned by most opinion polls, but
the margin of victory over the UMP belied the commentaries that thought it would be a close race.
The win builds upon the dress rehearsal of March’s municipal elections, where it was clear that the
party had finally learnt how to target its resources and maximise electoral returns. Marine Le Pen
and the party politburo have established the national presence that had escaped it for its previous
42 years.
With proportional election voting for MEPs in Brussels, rather than local government, an historically unpopular
president, and an opposition still weakened from its post-incumbency in-fighting, the Front National’s momentum
was always likely to see it exceed 20 per cent. But the critical threshold of defeating the UMP and François
Hollande’s Socialist Party has finally been stepped over, demonstrating to the electorate that the party is now an
equal player across the whole nation, and no longer merely a ‘nuisance’ to the mainstream with some local pockets
of support.
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The other parties have already portrayed this as the fault of an unpopular government, economic crisis and a
‘distant’ Europe. The FN, however, will argue that its support is a positive endorsement of its policies and leadership.
With the size of support, as well as its consistency since Marine Le Pen’s presidential performance in 2012, this will
be a difficult argument to counter. Unsurprisingly, there is already talk of a Right-Far Right run-off in the 2017
presidentials. With another three years until that race, the FN’s capacity to disrupt politics at home as well as in the
European hemicycle is significant.
Farage’s world is an authoritarian fantasy
Mary Evans is Centennial Professor at the LSE, based at the Gender Institute
The gains made by UKIP in the recent local and European elections in the UK have been subjected
to considerable attention, with an apparent consensus that those most attracted to UKIP are white,
working class men of advanced years, those ‘left behind’ by social changes which range from
deindustrialisation to gay marriage. No doubt this is true, but with it comes the problem of how to
counter UKIP, how to reject emphatically its politics without demonising its supporters and without
allowing Farage any of those moments of recognition and solidarity that underlie political allegiance.
So whilst George Osborne says that he ‘respects’ Farage, the question is how to claim a space which refuses this
respect for Farage and his policies without at the same time refusing respect for his supporters.
Three suggestions: the first is to assume that all voters ( and not just those opposed to Farage) are thinking people
and thus repudiate and demonstrate the absurdity of all Farage’s policies. Flat-rate taxation, for example, is an idea
so absurd that, as the great Jane Austen of the banknotes says, the idea is barely worth rational opposition. But
saying it is essential because not to do so allows Farage to be accepted as having a legitimate space in political
debate.
Second, do not exhibit any sympathy for the idea that Farage represents ‘ordinary’ people or even worse the ‘little
man’. Rubbish: ‘ordinary’ people run our transport system, the NHS, our schools and much else and all these people
spend their lives making a complex society work through collective engagements, based on acquired skills. It is
therefore necessary to say that almost none of us except the certifiably insane wish to be anywhere near, for
example, a hospital or an airline run by people who think ‘rules’ and ‘regulation’ are intrusive. Third, and finally, take
this former point further and make it plain that the most humanly sympathetic and creative communities (be they
institutions or towns and cities) are those accepting of difference. Make it, in short, clear that Farage’s world is an
authoritarian fantasy.
The most interesting development in Germany is the ascendancy of the Eurosceptic Alternative für
Deutschland
Kai Arzheimer is Professor of Politics at the University of Mainz
Following a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court late in February, the 2014 European election
was Germany’s first contest without a nationwide five per cent threshold since 1949. As a
consequence, seven very small parties, including Germany’s oldest extreme right party, the National
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), have won a seat in the EP. While this is hardly game
changing for the NPD, having a sitting MEP could provide an interesting twist if an attempted ban of
the party in Germany goes ahead and they try to appeal that ruling in Strasbourg.
Otherwise, the result was broadly in line with expectations. Confirming their current marginal role, the Free
Democrats (FDP), for decades the king makers in German Politics, lost roughly two thirds of their support and would
not have been represented at all under the previous electoral system. The most interesting development in
Germany is the ascendancy of the Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The party, which was founded only
a year ago, garnered seven per cent of the vote. While this pales in comparison to the results of other Eurosceptics,
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it is nonetheless the biggest national success for an outsider party since the late 1980s. Having seven freshly
elected MEPs will provide a moral, political and financial boost for the party in the state elections that will be held in
three of the Eastern states in August/September.
Despite the headlines about Euroscepticism, the voice of those worst affected by the crisis is now
louder. Could it be that a more sanguine reading of these electoral results is warranted?
Iain Begg is Professorial Research Fellow at the LSE’s European Institute
In addition to the high-profile matter of who should be appointed to its top jobs, the EU’s policy
agenda for the next year or two includes several very tricky issues which will test the ability of the
EU’s institutions to arrive at viable and satisfactory solutions. In particular, the reforms of economic
governance in response to the euro crisis remain incomplete and will require difficult decisions
about the underlying policy stance, burden-sharing among Member States, and the balance of
power between the supranational and national levels.  Many of the recent and prospective initiatives
in this area, such as mutualisation of debt or the creation of additional fiscal capacities and powers to help with
macroeconomic stabilisation, will deepen integration at a time when voters seems to want the opposite.
At first sight, therefore, the new European Parliament looks like a recipe for gridlock in decision-making. Not only is
the traditional left-right division now overlaid by a more unpredictable division between Europhiles and Eurosceptics,
but a clear message has also been sent to the elites that business as usual is no longer acceptable. Yet a more
subtle interpretation could be that the procrastination and squabbling over second-order concerns cannot continue
and that all the institutions need to look for more comprehensive and coherent solutions. Despite the headlines
about Euroscepticism, the voice of those worst affected by the crisis is now louder. Could it be that a more sanguine
reading of these electoral results is warranted?
Unlike the other radical right-wing parties is Europe, the Golden Dawn has managed to attract voters from
across the party system in Greece
Sofia Vasilopoulou is Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of York. Daphne
Halikiopoulo is Lecturer in Politics at the Politics and International Relations department at the
University of Reading.
Radical right-wing parties have emerged as the main winners of the 2014 European Parliament
elections. UKIP beat both its Labour and Conservative rivals in the UK, while in France the Front
National topped the polls with 25 per cent and 25 MEPs. Radical right-wing parties came third in
Austria, second in Hungary, and third in Greece, where the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn emerged as the
third party with just over 9 per cent according to latest estimates.
Unlike the other radical right-wing parties is Europe, the Golden Dawn has managed to attract
voters from across the party system in Greece. While the male, unskilled voters with low education
opt for the party, support also derives from women, people of all ages, people of all educational
backgrounds and those residing in more affluent constituencies. It is clear that in Greece it is not
absolute deprivation, but expectation of deprivation, a deprivation caused by ‘the enemies of
Greece’, that drives Golden Dawn’s support. Despite the second order character of these elections, this may prove
a destabilising longer-term trend.
The EP election results will clearly have great implications for the political landscape in Europe
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Sara Hagemann is Assistant Professor at the LSE’s European Institute
The EP election results will clearly have great implications for the political landscape in Europe –
not just for the European Parliament, but also for politics at domestic level and for governments’ EU
positions going forward.
What we are witnessing is, in a sense, a reconstitution of a form of class politics
Eric Shaw is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Stirling
The big news from the UK is, of course, UKIP’s triumph. For some Labour commentators the rise of
UKIP has been a ray of light in a rather sombre sky as it promises to splinter the right-wing vote.
This was always a myth and it has now been nailed. UKIP is clearly pulling large numbers of voters
from Labour as well as the Conservatives (we don’t know yet in what proportions). But this is not
surprising because it is part of a broader Europe-wide pattern. In countries such as France,
Denmark, Austria and others too the radical right have been penetrating deeply into strata of society which have
traditionally voted for the left. There is a deep rumble from the right.
Why is this occurring? Let’s take, as a point of departure, Cas Mudde’s analysis. He has identified three major
strands in mass attitudes which predispose people to vote for the radical right: nativism – that is, a belief that holds
that only indigenous inhabitants should have full civic and social rights – authoritarianism, and populism which
counterposes the ordinary people against the ‘elite’, the political class, the liberal intelligentsia. This, combined,
constitutes what the cultural theorist Stuart Hall called ‘authoritarian populism.’
In his theory of ‘pathological normalcy’ Mudde contends that authoritarian populism, far from being confined to the
margins, is deeply embedded within the mainstream. Two factors, one can argue, have propelled it into the forefront
of political consciousness. The first is the rising salience, and emotional voltage of anti-immigrant feeling, that is to
say mounting antipathy, resentment and apprehension towards those – whether they be recent immigrants, asylum-
seekers or established ethnic minorities – who constitute ‘the other’.
The second is, of course, the impact of the financial crash and the economic recession. The effect of this has not
been (in the UK or in a majority of other European countries) a tilt to the left. Left-wing diagnoses, at least in the UK,
have had little purchase: there is only a muted sense that the gyrations of the financial system are in any way
responsible for what went wrong. Most people, one suspects, are left baffled by talk of sub-prime mortgages,
derivatives and credit default swaps They are looking for something more tangible to blame: if not Gordon Brown
then welfare recipients and, of course, immigrants.
The implication of all this is disturbing for left-of-centre parties, not least Labour. Research for some while has
indicated that authoritarian populism appeals in particular to the more poorly-educated, to manual workers and to
routine clerical workers: the natural constituency of the left. What we are witnessing is, in a sense, a reconstitution
of a form of class politics. Labour, during the Blair/Brown years, was at pains to insist that it had ceased to be a
(working) class party, that it was a party of ‘Middle England.’ Many working class voters, one could say, got the
message: Labour was not for them, it was not part of ‘them’ not ‘us’. Now Miliband has to demonstrate otherwise.
The reverberations of the Ukraine crisis in the Latvian domestic political debate certainly did not help
Harmony in its bid to attract the Latvian leftist vote
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Licia Cianetti is a PhD candidate at University College London
The decisive victory for the governing party Unity surprised Latvian political commentators. Unity
gathered 46 per cent of the vote and four out of eight seats, leaving the nationalist National Alliance
(NA) a distant second with 14 per cent. Crucially, the moderate Russophone party Harmony –
widely indicated as the expected winner of these elections – came only third with 13 per cent. While
the one seat (8 per cent) gained by the Union of Greens and Farmers is in line with pre-electoral
expectations, the fact that Tatjana Ždanoka from the Latvian Russian Union (LRU, formerly For
Human Rights in a United Russia) managed to retain her MEP seat was more unexpected.
The dismal turnout and the absolute numbers behind the percentages offer an explanation. Turnout was only 30 per
cent, down from 53 per cent in 2009. This means about 350,000 votes less, which – with 445,225 people actually
voting – are hardly negligible. If we look at absolute numbers, compared to its constituent parties’ 2009 results, Unity
kept most of its votes, decreasing only slightly. So these elections can hardly be interpreted as a sensational surge
for Unity as the percentage would suggest. NA marginally increased its votes, while LRU actually more than halved
its support. The big loser remains Harmony: in 2009, the Harmony Centre coalition with the Socialist Party received
over 150,000 votes, but in these elections (when they ran separately) they lost almost 100,000. The reverberations
of the Ukraine crisis in the Latvian domestic political debate certainly did not help Harmony in its bid to attract the
Latvian leftist vote. However, the main question the party will have to answer is why it failed so spectacularly to
mobilise its electorate.
The European election confirms the recession of two-party politics and the advancement of left
Eurocriticism
Juan Rodríguez-Teruel is Lecturer of Politics in the University of Valencia
While the European elections in Spain did not back right parties or Europhobic politics, compared to
the main European trend, the results will bring Spanish politics to a new political scenario.
After months of negative prospects for the two main Spanish political parties (PP and PSOE), the
European Elections not only confirmed the expectations of a strong decrease for them, but lead to
quick dramatic internal changes. The Socialist leader Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba resigned the day
after the election, calling for a new party leadership contest and maybe a tight primary election in the autumn to
select the party candidate for 2015. His opponent, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, will have some more time to think
about the PP’s loss of almost 40 per cent of the support received in 2009. Both PSOE and PP have lost together
more than 5 million votes and now represent only 48 per cent of the total vote. As with the overall European
participation, turnout remained around the same level of 2009 (45.6 per cent).
In contrast, several political parties benefited from this situation. Amongst them, the Communist party, Catalan and
Basque non-state wide parties and several new organisations from the centre and left. Amongst them, the new left
party ‘Podemos’ (‘We Can’) delivered a strong performance after being created just some weeks before the election.
Similarly, most of these new parties (which will join liberal and left groups in the chamber) support left ‘Eurocriticism’
and reject the austerity policies led by Europe.
This election also allowed for a test of the evolution of Catalan politics and the support for Catalan independence.
The left secessionist party (ERC) defeated Catalan socialists and the ruling moderate Catalan nationalist party, and
became the first party in Catalonia. Its performance will fuel new tensions in the Spanish territorial debate over the
coming months.
The elections in Hungary were a symbol of the population’s continued disappointment with the inability of
the liberal-left opposition forces to unite
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Erin Marie Saltman is a research project officer at the counter-extremism think tank Quilliam
The Hungarian European Parliamentary election results are an accurate reflection of the majority
population’s continued support of right wing and radical right parties on the one hand, and
disappointment and disillusionment with liberal and left wing party options on the other.
On Sunday, Hungary witnessed a record low turnout for the European Parliamentary elections at a
mere 28 per cent, just one month after the country’s national elections.  Ruling party Fidesz, who
currently hold a supermajority in government, became the only party in Europe to gain an absolute majority in this
year’s EP elections with 51.49 per cent (12 seats).
However, equal attention was given to radical right party, Jobbik who gained 14.68 per cent  (3 seats) making them
the strongest opposition party in Hungary. Jobbik’s electoral victory came despite recent allegations against Jobbik
EP candidate Bela Kovacs, who was accused in the national conservative paper, Magyar Nemzet, of spying for
Russia against the European Union – allegations denied by Kovacs. The strongly Eurosceptic radical nationalist
party sends Kovacs along with Zoltán Balczó and Krisztina Morvai (who has caused frequent controversy over her
openly anti-Semitic remarks) to the European Parliament, with the aim of changing the EU into a ‘looser coalition’.
Jobbik Chairman, Gábor Vona, commented on the success of Eurosceptic parties EU-wide saying that they proved
‘all of us would like to have a common Europe but something totally different from what is offered to us now’.
Meanwhile, the disunity of liberal and left wing parties continued. The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), who led the
Hungarian government between 2002 and 2010, faced a crushing defeat, gaining only 10.92 per cent (2 seats).
Other opposition parties shared equally poor results, a symbol of the population’s continued disappointment with the
inability of the liberal-left opposition forces to unite.
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